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Can adults make fair moral judgments when individuals with whom they have
different relationships are involved? The present study explored the fairness of adults’
relationship-based moral judgments in two respects by performing three experiments
involving 999 participants. In Experiment 1, 65 adults were asked to decide whether to
harm a specific person to save five strangers in the footbridge and trolley dilemmas
in a within-subject design. The lone potential victim was a relative, a best friend, a
person they disliked, a criminal or a stranger. Adults’ genetic relatedness to, familiarity
with and affective relatedness to the lone potential victims varied. The results indicated
that adults made different moral judgments involving the lone potential victims with
whom they had different relationships. In Experiment 2, 306 adults responded to the
footbridge and trolley dilemmas involving five types of lone potential victims in a within-
subject design, and the extent to which they were familiar with and affectively related
to the lone potential victim was measured. The results generally replicated those of
Experiment 1. In addition, for close individuals, adults’ moral judgments were less
deontological relative to their familiarity with or positive affect toward these individuals.
For individuals they were not close to, adults made deontological choices to a larger
extent relative to their unfamiliarity with or negative affect toward these individuals.
Moreover, for familiar individuals, the extent to which adults made deontological moral
judgments more closely approximated the extent to which they were familiar with the
individual. The adults’ deontological moral judgments involving unfamiliar individuals
more closely approximated their affective relatedness to the individuals. In Experiment
3, 628 adults were asked to make moral judgments with the type of lone potential
victim as the between-subject variable. The results generally replicated those of the
previous two experiments. Therefore, the present study shows that, in addition to
apparent unfairness, latent fairness exists in adults’ relationship-based moral judgments.
Moral judgments involving individuals with whom adults have different relationships have
different cognitive and affective bases.
Keywords: moral judgments, relationships, fairness, familiarity, affective relatedness
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 December 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1871
Hao et al. Relationship-Based Moral Judgments
INTRODUCTION
Society born and society bred, all individuals are inevitably
confronted with various moral problems. How these problems
are solved crucially depends on one’s moral judgment. Moral
judgments refer to evaluations of behavior in terms of right
and wrong (Haidt, 2001). It has been demonstrated that adults’
moral judgments play an important role in their morals-related
behavior, such as prosocial, delinquency, and cheating behavior
(Raaijmakers et al., 2005; Carlo et al., 2012; Xu and Ma,
2015).
Moral judgments are typically reﬂected in one’s responses
to moral dilemmas. In the classic trolley dilemma (Thomson,
1985), a runaway trolley is about to hit ﬁve people standing
on its track. The only way to save the people is to switch
the trolley onto another track. However, the intervention will
cause the death of one person standing on the other track.
Should the one person be harmed to save the ﬁve people?
Diﬀerent principles support diﬀerent decisions. The utilitarian
principle (Mill, 1998) emphasizes that it is important tomaximize
the good of the majority of people. Therefore, switching the
trolley to save the ﬁve people is the right choice. By contrast,
according to the deontological principle (Kant, 1959), behavior
must be in accordance with moral rules regardless of the
consequences. From this perspective, redirecting the trolley onto
another track is unacceptable because it is immoral to harm an
innocent person. Previous studies show that most adults choose
to save the ﬁve people by harming the lone person, making
utilitarian moral judgments (Hauser et al., 2007; Waldmann
and Dieterich, 2007; Pellizzoni et al., 2010; Navarrete et al.,
2012).
However, adults seem to abide by the utilitarian principle only
in the case of the trolley dilemma. In a variant of the dilemma,
the footbridge dilemma (Thomson, 1986), a large person on a
footbridge can be pushed down to prevent a trolley from hitting
ﬁve people. At the same time, the intervention will undoubtedly
cause the death of the large person. When physical contact is
involved, adults less often choose to save more people at the
cost of one person’s life and judge that this type of harm is
worse than harm involving no physical contact (Cushman et al.,
2006; Hauser et al., 2007; Pellizzoni et al., 2010; Powell et al.,
2012).
The less utilitarian choice in the footbridge dilemma implies
that adults do not consider the good of ﬁve people to always
be more important than that of one person. Speciﬁcally, in
the footbridge dilemma, adults are rather close to the lone
potential victim. The close spatial distance may cause adults to
pay more attention to the welfare of the person. Is it possible
that mental distance, i.e., relationships, between adults and the
lone potential victim also aﬀects their moral judgments? Previous
studies provide some indirect or incomplete evidence. For
example, Ma (1992) found that adolescents and adults showed
a greater altruistic orientation toward others with whom they
had closer relationships. Similarly, Bleske-Rechek et al. (2010)
discovered that the more adolescents and adults were genetically
related to the lone potential victim, the less they were willing
to sacriﬁce the person’s life in the trolley dilemma. A recent
study (Tassy et al., 2013) examined students’ moral judgments
involving relatives, close friends and strangers and found that
their moral judgments depended on their aﬀective proximity to
these people.
Although previous studies have examined the eﬀect of
relationships on adults’ moral judgments to some extent, they
have mainly focused on positive relationships. According to the
hierarchy of human relationships (Ma, 1985, 1992), people can
be categorized into diﬀerent groups including relatives, best
friends, special strangers, common strangers and someone you
dislike or enemies in order. An actor has the strongest altruistic
orientation toward the group ranking ﬁrst and the weakest
altruistic orientation toward the group ranking last because the
actor has diﬀerent relationships with these groups of people. The
relationships vary in genetic relatedness, familiarity, and aﬀective
relatedness. As a result, it is necessary to include lone potential
victims who have diﬀerent relationships with adults in terms of
these three dimensions.
More importantly, it remains unclear whether adults’
relationship-basedmoral judgments reﬂect the unfairness of their
moral judgments. Although previous studies have shown that
unfairness exists in adults’ moral judgments, the studies appear
inconsistent with some important theoretical perspectives. In
cognitive-developmental theory, moral judgments eventually
reach the post-conventional level (Colby and Kohlberg, 1987).
At this level universal principles of justice are important
in one’s moral judgments. One cares about the equality of
all people’s rights. According to moral foundations theory
(Haidt and Joseph, 2004; Haidt and Graham, 2007), some
psychological systems evolve and lead to certain intuitive
foundations in the moral domain across cultures. One of the
foundations is that of fairness/reciprocity. Fairness develops
because speciﬁc emotions such as guilt evolve and are
experienced in reciprocal interactions. Therefore, fairness may
exist in adults’ moral judgments according to these theoretical
perspectives. Taken together, empirical studies and classic
theories suggest that there may be diﬀerent aspects of fairness
in adults’ moral judgments. The fairness of their moral
judgments may be manifested in one aspect but not others.
In fact, there may be at least two aspects of fairness. One
emphasizes whether diﬀerent individuals are treated fairly. This
aspect involves cross-sectional comparisons of adults’ moral
judgments toward diﬀerent individuals. It appears that adults
treat diﬀerent types of lone potential victims diﬀerently and
thus apparent unfairness exists in their moral judgments.
The other emphasizes whether an individual is treated fairly
relative to his/her relationships with decision-makers. This
aspect involves longitudinal comparisons of adults’ moral
judgments toward the individual and their relationships with
the individual. If adults’ moral judgments involving speciﬁc
individuals correspond to their relationships with the individuals,
latent unfairness exists in their moral judgments. For example,
some adults believe that they very much should not protect
the lone potential victim when they are very unfamiliar or
very much dislike the person. However, consider the following
example. Although adults are not familiar with or do not
like a potential victim, they are still willing to protect the
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person to some extent, which indicates that the extent to
which adults protect the person does not match the extent
to which they are familiar with or like the person. Adults
make deontological moral judgments involving the person
to a greater extent relative to their relationships with the
person. Therefore, there is latent fairness in adults’ moral
judgments.
Furthermore, the importance of cognition and aﬀect in adults’
relationship-based moral judgments remains unclear. According
to the perspectives of Greene et al. (2001, 2004), moral judgments
are driven by either cognitive or emotional processes. The
researchers also maintain that the two processes are sometimes
competitive. Because the extent to which adults are familiar with
or like speciﬁc individuals varies, it is possible that cognitive
processes play a crucial role in adults’ moral judgments involving
certain types of individuals, whereas aﬀective processes are
important for their moral judgments involving other types of
individuals. Tassy et al. (2013) indicated that students’ moral
judgments were inﬂuenced by their aﬀective proximity to the
potential victim, but how they were aﬀectively related to diﬀerent
potential victims was not investigated. Therefore, it is necessary
to measure the extent to which adults are familiar with and like
the lone potential victim. If adults’ moral judgments approximate
their familiarity with the lone potential victim, the cognitive
eﬀect is important. If their moral judgments approximate their
aﬀective relatedness to the lone potential victim, the role of aﬀect
is distinct.
In sum, the present study aims to explore the fairness of
adults’ relationship-based moral judgments and its cognitive and
aﬀective bases. In Experiment 1, adults were asked to decide
whether to harm a speciﬁc individual to save ﬁve strangers in
simpliﬁed footbridge and trolley dilemmas. The potential victims
diﬀered in whether they were genetically related to, familiar
to and liked by the adults. In Experiment 2, the adults’ moral
judgment pattern found in Experiment 1 was tested in the classic
footbridge and trolley dilemmas with a large sample. The extent
to which adults were familiar with and liked the potential victim
was measured, and its correspondence to their moral judgments
was examined. Experiment 3 further tested previous results
with the type of lone potential victims as the between-subject
variable. Because the principle of fairness develops in adulthood,
it is hypothesized that there may be latent fairness in adults’
relationship-based moral judgments. Adults’ moral judgments
involving close individuals may be less deontological relative to
their positive relationships with these individuals. Adults’ moral
judgments involving individuals they are not close to may be
more deontological relative to their negative relationships with
these individuals. Furthermore, the latent fairness may also make
cognition and aﬀect diﬀer in their importance for relationship-
based moral judgments. Adults’ deontological moral judgments
involving familiar individuals may more closely approximate
their familiarity with these individuals because familiarity is a
more objective basis. For individuals with whom adults are not
familiar, aﬀect may be the only available basis for their moral
judgments. Thus, adults’ deontological moral judgments may
more closely approximate their aﬀective relatedness to these
individuals.
EXPERIMENT 1
The aim of Experiment 1 was to reveal adults’ moral judgment
pattern involving individuals with whom they had various
relationships. Adults were required to decide whether to harm a
speciﬁc individual to save ﬁve strangers in simpliﬁed footbridge
and trolley dilemmas. The lone potential victim was a relative, a
best friend, a person whom the adult disliked or a criminal, with
a stranger as the control condition.
Participants
Sixty-ﬁve college students participated in the experiment: 31
males and 34 females. Their ages ranged from 18.92 to
27.67 years (M = 20.71, SD = 1.58). In a within-subject design,
a footbridge and a trolley dilemma were presented to each
participant. Participants were asked to answer ﬁve test questions
in each dilemma. A within-subject design was used to indicate
whether one participant made fair judgments when diﬀerent
lone potential victims were involved. A stranger-conditioned
test question was asked ﬁrst because participants’ answer to it
served as their baseline performance. The other test questions
were presented in a ﬁxed order because our pilot experiment
found that participants gave consistent answers regardless of the
question order. The experiment was approved by the Research
Ethics Board of Department of Psychology of Capital Normal
University. Informed written consent was obtained from all of
the participants.
Materials and Procedure
The Lone Potential Victim
Based on the hierarchy of human relationships (Ma, 1985, 1992),
the lone potential victim in the experiment was a relative, a best
friend, a person whom the participant disliked, or a criminal.
Participants were closest to their relatives and most distant from
criminals in terms of relationships. Because a common stranger
had no speciﬁc relationship with participants, the stranger was
regarded as the control condition. The relationships between
participants and each lone potential victim are presented in
Table 1.
Moral Judgments
The footbridge and trolley dilemmas of Pellizzoni et al.’s
(2010) were used to measure participants’ moral judgments.
The dilemmas were tested in samples of children and adults.
The scenarios were relatively simple, and control questions
guaranteed participants’ correct understanding of the scenario in
TABLE 1 | The relationships between participants and each lone potential
victim.
The potential
victim
Genetic
relatedness
Familiarity Affective
relatedness
Stranger Genetic unrelated Unfamiliar Neutral
Relative Genetic related Familiar Positive
Best friend Genetic unrelated Familiar Positive
Disliked person Genetic unrelated Familiar Negative
Criminal Genetic unrelated Unfamiliar Negative
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each dilemma; thus, participants could understand the dilemmas
without the interference of many details. A minor revision that
was made in the present experiment was that participants served
as the intervention actors in the two dilemmas. For example,
in the original footbridge dilemma, the intervention actor was
a protagonist John. In the present experiment, the intervention
actors were the participants. Therefore, “John” was replaced by
“you” in the moral dilemma below.
Participants were tested individually in a quiet room. The
experimenter described the moral dilemmas to the participants.
At the same time, the participants were presented with a
schematic illustration of each moral dilemma. Thus, participants
could directly witness the moral situations that were described
and understand them well. They then answered the control
questions and test questions involving lone potential victims with
whom they had diﬀerent relationships.
The footbridge dilemma (Pellizzoni et al., 2010, p. 266)
A big ball is running quickly along this track. On the track,
there are ﬁve people who do not see the ball rolling down
because they are looking in front of them. (Control question
1: Do these people see the ball rolling down the street?) The
ball is rolling down this street and it will soon badly hurt
ﬁve people. You are on a footbridge between the big ball and
the ﬁve people. On the footbridge, close to you there is a big
person. The person does not see the ball rolling down because
he is looking in front of him. (Control question 2: Does this
person see the ball rolling down?) You know that the only way
to stop the big ball is to drop a very heavy weight into the street.
You know that if you push down the big person close to you,
the big person will be badly hurt but the other ﬁve people will
be safe. Test question 1: What should you do? Push the person
or not push the person?
Test questions 2–5 were the same as question 1 except that the
lone potential victim was a relative, a best friend, a person whom
the participant disliked and a criminal, respectively. For example,
test question 2 was “If the person is your relative, push the person
or not push the person?” Therefore, in the footbridge dilemma,
the lone potential victim was the one to push in the footbridge.
The trolley dilemma (Pellizzoni et al., 2010)
The trolley dilemma resembled the footbridge dilemma except
that the participants could pull a string and make the ball go
onto another track where one person stood. Accordingly, the
intervention would badly hurt the person. Participants were
asked similar control and test questions. Therefore, in the trolley
dilemma, the lone potential victim was the one who stood alone
on the alternative track.
Results and Discussion
All of the participants answered the control questions correctly.
The percentages of participants who decided to harm a speciﬁc
person to save ﬁve strangers are shown in Figure 1. Binomial
tests indicated that in the footbridge dilemma, when the lone
potential victimwas a stranger, a relative, a best friend, or a person
whom the participant disliked, the percentage of the participants
who decided to intervene was signiﬁcantly lower than the chance
FIGURE 1 | Percentages of participants who decided to harm a lone
potential victim to save five strangers from being hurt in Experiment 1.
level, p = 0.006, p < 0.001, p < 0.001, p = 0.046, respectively.
There was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the chance level and
the percentage of participants who decided to harm a criminal,
p = 0.321. In the trolley dilemma, binomial tests showed that
the percentage of participants deciding to harm a relative or a
best friend was also signiﬁcantly lower than the chance level,
ps < 0.001. The percentage of participants who decided to harm
a stranger or person they disliked was comparable to the chance
level, p = 1.000, p = 0.084, respectively. In addition, a large
proportion of participants chose to sacriﬁce a criminal to save
other people, p= 0.001.
Participants’ moral judgments involving each lone potential
victim were compared using McNemar tests. The results of the
footbridge dilemmas are shown in Table 2. Generally, of the
participants who did not provide similar responses to each two-
victim comparison, signiﬁcantly more participants chose to harm
one victim but not the other except for the relative vs. best
friend and disliked person vs. stranger comparisons. In the trolley
dilemma, similar results were obtained (Table 3).
Experiment 1 indicated that adults made diﬀerent moral
judgments for individuals with whom they had diﬀerent
relationships. When the lone potential victims with whom they
had a positive relationship were involved, participants preferred
less utilitarian moral judgments. This result is consistent with
previous studies (Bleske-Rechek et al., 2010; Tassy et al.,
2013). Confronted with the lone potential victims with whom
participants had negative relationships, participants showed a
utilitarian tendency in their moral judgments. This ﬁnding
indicates that apparent unfairness exists in adults’ relationship-
based moral judgments. However, several issues remain to be
clariﬁed. First, it is not clear whether adults’ moral judgments
involving speciﬁc individuals correspond to their relationships
with the individuals. Second, it is also unknown whether their
moral judgments involving speciﬁc individuals approximate their
familiarity with the individuals or their aﬀective relatedness to
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TABLE 2 | Comparisons of participants’ responses to different lone potential victim in the footbridge dilemma in Experiment 1.
Percentages of participants who
did and did not provide similar
responses to each comparison
Of the participants who did not provide
similar responses, number of participants
choosing to harm the former and the latter
McNemar test for participants who
did not provide similar responses
Relative vs. Stranger 72% vs. 28% 0 vs. 18 p < 0.001
Relative vs. Best friend 100% vs. 0% 0 vs. 0 p = 1.000
Relative vs. Disliked person 68% vs. 32% 0 vs. 21 p < 0.001
Relative vs. Criminal 48% vs. 52% 0 vs. 34 p < 0.001
Best friend vs. Stranger 72% vs. 28% 0 vs. 18 p < 0.001
Best friend vs. Disliked person 68% vs. 32% 0 vs. 21 p < 0.001
Best friend vs. Criminal 48% vs. 52% 0 vs. 34 p < 0.001
Disliked person vs. Stranger 86% vs. 14% 6 vs. 3 p = 0.508
Disliked person vs. Criminal 77% vs. 23% 1 vs. 14 p = 0.001
Criminal vs. Stranger 72% vs. 28% 17 vs. 1 p < 0.001
TABLE 3 | Comparisons of participants’ responses to different lone potential victim in the trolley dilemma in Experiment 1.
Percentages of participants who
did and did not provide similar
responses to each comparison
Of the participants who did not provide
similar responses, number of participants
choosing to harm the former and the latter
McNemar test for participants who
did not provide similar responses
Relative vs. Stranger 57% vs. 43% 1 vs. 27 p < 0.001
Relative vs. Best friend 97% vs. 3% 0 vs. 2 p = 0.500
Relative vs. Disliked person 58% vs. 42% 0 vs. 27 p < 0.001
Relative vs. Criminal 40% vs. 60% 0 vs. 39 p < 0.001
Best friend vs. Stranger 60% vs. 40% 1 vs. 25 p < 0.001
Best friend vs. Disliked person 62% vs. 38% 0 vs. 25 p < 0.001
Best friend vs. Criminal 43% vs. 57% 0 vs. 37 p < 0.001
Disliked person vs. Stranger 86% vs. 14% 5 vs. 4 p = 1.000
Disliked person vs. Criminal 82% vs. 18% 0 vs. 12 p < 0.001
Criminal vs. Stranger 80% vs. 20% 13 vs. 0 p < 0.001
the individuals. In addition, the moral judgment pattern found
in Experiment 1 must be conﬁrmed with classic moral dilemmas
in a large sample.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 explored whether there was latent fairness
in adults’ relationship-based moral judgments. The extent
to which adults were willing to protect a lone potential
victim was compared to the extent to which they were
familiar with and aﬀectively related to the victim. A large
sample of participants was tested with classic moral
dilemmas.
Participants
Three hundred six college students participated in the
experiment: 133 males and 173 females. Their ages ranged
from 18.05 to 24.28 years (M = 19.67, SD = 0.95). In a
within-subject design, each participant responded to ﬁve
test questions in a footbridge and a trolley dilemma. The
stranger-conditioned questions were asked ﬁrst because
participants’ answers to these questions served as their baseline
performance. The other questions and the two dilemmas
were presented to the participants in a counterbalanced order
(Latin square). Moreover, participants were asked to rate the
extent to which they were familiar with and liked a speciﬁc
potential victim. The experiment was approved by the Research
Ethics Board of Department of Psychology of Capital Normal
University. Informed written consent was obtained from all of
the participants.
Materials and Procedure
Moral Judgments
The moral dilemmas reported by Hauser et al. (2007) were
used to assess participants’ moral judgments. A minor revision
that was made in the present experiment was that participants
served as the intervention actors in the dilemmas. For example,
in the original footbridge dilemma, the intervention actor was
a protagonist Frank. The intervention actors in the present
experiment were the participants. Therefore, “Frank” was
replaced by “you” in the moral dilemma below. Anonymous
questionnaires were presented to participants. After reading each
dilemma, participants were asked to indicate whether they should
harm a speciﬁc individual to save ﬁve strangers ﬁrst and then to
rate their choices on a rating scale from 1 (very much should not
do it), 2 (moderately should not do it), 3 (slightly should not do
it), 4 (slightly should do it), 5 (moderately should do it) to 6 (very
much should do it).
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The footbridge dilemma (Hauser et al., 2007, p. 18)
You are on a footbridge over the train tracks. You know trains
and can see that the one approaching the bridge is out of
control. On the track under the bridge there are ﬁve people;
the banks are so steep that they will not be able to get oﬀ the
track in time. You know that the only way to stop an out-of-
control train is to drop a very heavyweight into its path. But the
only available, suﬃciently heavy weight is a large man wearing
a backpack, also watching the train from the footbridge. You
can shove the man with the backpack onto the track in the
path of the train, killing him; or you can refrain from doing
this, letting the ﬁve die.
Test question 1: What should you do? Shove the man or not
shove the man? Please choose from 1 (verymuch should not do it)
to 6 (verymuch should do it). Test questions 2–5 were the same as
test question 1 except that the lone potential victim was a relative,
a best friend, a person the participant disliked and a criminal,
respectively. For example, test question 2 was “If the man is your
relative, shove the man or not shove the man? Please choose from
1 (very much should not do it) to 6 (very much should do it).”
Therefore, in the footbridge dilemma, the lone potential victim
was the one to shove.
The trolley dilemma (Hauser et al., 2007)
Minor revisions were made in the trolley dilemma so that
the scenario was parallel to that in Experiment 1. In the trolley
dilemma, participants could throw a switch to turn the train
onto another track. However, the action would cause the death
of a man standing on the other track. Participants were asked
similar test questions. Therefore, in the trolley dilemma, the lone
potential victim was the one who stood alone on the alternative
track.
Rating of Relationships
Participants were asked to rate their familiarity with each speciﬁc
potential victim on a rating scale from 1 (very unfamiliar with
the person), 2 (moderately unfamiliar with the person), 3 (slightly
unfamiliar with the person), 4 (slightly familiar with the person),
5(moderately familiar with the person) to 6 (very familiar with the
person). Similarly, they were also required to rate their aﬀective
relatedness to the victim on a rating scale from 1 (very much
dislike the person), 2 (moderately dislike the person), 3 (slightly
dislike the person), 4 (slightly like the person), 5 (moderately
like the person) to 6 (very much like the person). Anonymous
questionnaires were used to measure participants’ relationships
with the speciﬁc potential victims.
Results and Discussion
Moral Judgments Involving Lone Potential Victims
with Different Relationships with the Participants
The percentages of participant who decided to harm a speciﬁc
person are shown in Figure 2. The percentages were compared to
the chance level using binomial tests. In the footbridge dilemma,
when the lone potential victim was a relative, a best friend,
a disliked person, or a stranger, the percentage of participants
deciding to harm the person was signiﬁcantly lower than the
chance level, ps < 0.001. There were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
FIGURE 2 | Percentages of participants who decided to harm a lone
potential victim to save five strangers from death in Experiment 2.
between the percentage of participants who were willing to harm
a criminal and the chance level, p= 0.076. In the trolley dilemma,
the percentage of participants deciding to harm a relative or
best friend was also signiﬁcantly lower than the chance level,
ps < 0.001. The percentage of participants choosing to harm
a disliked person was similar to the chance level, p = 0.864.
The majority of participants were willing to sacriﬁce a criminal,
p < 0.001. Therefore, the results were similar to those of
Experiment 1 except that the percentage of participants who
decided to harm a stranger was signiﬁcantly above the chance
level in the trolley dilemma, p= 0.019.
Participants’ moral judgments involving each speciﬁc
potential victim were compared using McNemar tests. The
results of the footbridge and trolley dilemmas are shown in
Tables 4 and 5. The results resembled those of Experiment 1.
However, some diﬀerences were found. In the footbridge
dilemma, of the participants who made diﬀerent decisions in
the relative vs. best friend comparison, more participants were
willing to sacriﬁce the best friend. Of the participants who made
diﬀerent decisions when a person they disliked and a stranger
was involved, more participants chose to harm the person they
disliked. In the trolley dilemma, more participants were willing
to sacriﬁce a best friend compared to a relative, and a stranger
compared to a disliked person.
Participants’ ratings of their willingness to harm a speciﬁc
potential victim are shown in Figure 3. A 5 (victim type) × 2
(dilemma type) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted.
A signiﬁcant interaction eﬀect between the two factors was
found, F(4,302) = 11.44, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.132. First, a
repeated measures ANOVA with the type of victim as the
within-subject factor was carried out for each moral dilemma.
In the footbridge dilemma, a main eﬀect of the victim type
was observed, F(4,302) = 67.98, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.474.
Multiple comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment showed
that there were signiﬁcant diﬀerences between rating scores
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TABLE 4 | Comparisons of participants’ responses to different lone potential victim in the footbridge dilemma in Experiment 2.
Percentages of participants who
did and did not provide similar
responses to each comparison
Of the participants who did not provide
similar responses, number of participants
choosing to harm the former and the latter
McNemar test for participants who
did not provide similar responses
Relative vs. Stranger 84% vs. 16% 2 vs. 46 p < 0.001
Relative vs. Best friend 98% vs. 2% 0 vs. 6 p = 0.031
Relative vs. Disliked person 80% vs. 20% 2 vs. 60 p < 0.001
Relative vs. Criminal 64% vs. 36% 1 vs. 110 p < 0.001
Best friend vs. Stranger 84% vs. 16% 5 vs. 43 p < 0.001
Best friend vs. Disliked person 80% vs. 20% 4 vs. 56 p < 0.001
Best friend vs. Criminal 64% vs. 36% 3 vs. 106 p < 0.001
Disliked person vs. Stranger 88% vs. 12% 25 vs. 11 p = 0.030
Disliked person vs. Criminal 82% vs. 18% 2 vs. 53 p < 0.001
Criminal vs. Stranger 77% vs. 23% 67 vs. 2 p < 0.001
TABLE 5 | Comparisons of participants’ responses to different lone potential victim in the trolley dilemma in Experiment 2.
Percentages of participants who
did and did not provide similar
responses to each comparison
Of the participants who did not provide
similar responses, number of participants
choosing to harm the former and the latter
McNemar test for participants who
did not provide similar responses
Relative vs. Stranger 58% vs. 42% 7 vs. 120 p < 0.001
Relative vs. Best friend 93% vs. 7% 4 vs. 17 p = 0.007
Relative vs. Disliked person 66% vs. 34% 5 vs. 99 p < 0.001
Relative vs. Criminal 48% vs. 52% 7 vs. 153 p < 0.001
Best friend vs. Stranger 63% vs. 37% 6 vs. 106 p < 0.001
Best friend vs. Disliked person 71% vs. 29% 4 vs. 85 p < 0.001
Best friend vs. Criminal 54% vs. 46% 4 vs. 137 p < 0.001
Disliked person vs. Stranger 83% vs. 17% 17 vs. 36 p = 0.013
Disliked person vs. Criminal 76% vs. 24 % 10 vs. 62 p < 0.001
Criminal vs. Stranger 80% vs. 20% 47 vs. 14 p < 0.001
FIGURE 3 | Participants’ rating of their willingness to harm a lone
potential victim to save five strangers from death in Experiment 2.
Error bars represent standard error.
for any two potential victims, ps < 0.05. Participants were
least willing to harm a relative and most willing to harm
a criminal. In the trolley dilemma, there was also a main
eﬀect of the victim type, F(4,302) = 65.71, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.465. Multiple comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment
indicated signiﬁcant diﬀerences between rating scores for any
two potential victims, ps < 0.05. The results were similar
to those of the footbridge dilemma except that participants
were more willing to sacriﬁce a stranger than a disliked
person. Second, a t test was conducted for each lone potential
victim to compare participants’ moral judgments in the
footbridge and trolley dilemmas. The results indicated that
participants decided to sacriﬁce a lone potential victim more
unwillingly in the footbridge dilemma than they did in the
trolley dilemma, regardless of the type of the victim. For the
relative, t(305) = −8.13, p < 0.001, d = 0.480. For the best
friend, t(305) = −8.70, p < 0.001, d = 0.511. For disliked
person, t(305) = −9.16, p < 0.001, d = 0.521. For the criminal,
t(305) = −7.40, p < 0.001, d = 0.425. For the stranger,
t(305) =−12.28, p< 0.001, d = 0.706.
The Consistency between Moral Judgments Involving
a Lone Potential Victim and Relationships with the
Victim
To investigate whether adults’ moral judgments involving a
speciﬁc potential victim matched their relationships with the
victim, their rating of willingness to harm a speciﬁc potential
victim was reverse-scored. Thus, the reverse rating scores
represented the extent to which adults were willing to protect
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FIGURE 4 | Extent to which participants are familiar with, like and
protect a lone potential victim in the footbridge and trolley dilemmas
in Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard error.
the potential victim, i.e., deontological moral judgments. The
extent to which participants are familiar with, like and protect
a lone potential victim in the footbridge and trolley dilemmas
are shown in Figure 4. A 5 (victim type) × 3 (rating type:
familiarity, aﬀective relatedness, willingness to protect a lone
potential victim in the footbridge dilemma) repeated measures
ANOVA indicated a signiﬁcant interaction eﬀect of the two
factors, F(8,297) = 255.16, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.873. Thus, a
repeated measures ANOVA with the rating type as the within-
subject factor was carried out for each lone potential victim.
For the relative, the main eﬀect of rating type was signiﬁcant,
F(2,304) = 8.29, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.052. Multiple comparisons
with Bonferroni adjustment showed that participants’ rating
scores of their willingness to protect the relative were signiﬁcantly
lower than those of familiarity with and aﬀective relatedness to
their relative, p = 0.048, p = 0.001, respectively. For the best
friend, a signiﬁcant main eﬀect was also found, F(2,304)= 24.09,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.137. Multiple comparisons indicated that
participants’ rating scores of their willingness to protect the best
friend were signiﬁcantly lower than those of aﬀective proximity
to the best friend (p = 0.016) but not those of familiarity
with the person (p = 0.868). When the lone potential victim
was a person whom the participant disliked, the main eﬀect
of rating type was signiﬁcant, F(2,303) = 510.83, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.771. However, multiple comparisons demonstrated that
participants’ ratings of their willingness to protect the person
were signiﬁcantly higher than their ratings of familiarity with
and aﬀective relatedness to the person, ps < 0.001. Similar main
eﬀects were observed for both the criminal [F(2,304) = 338.37,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.690] and the stranger [F(2,304) = 674.43,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.816]. Participants’ ratings of their willingness
to protect the criminal were signiﬁcantly higher than those of
their familiarity with and aﬀective relatedness to the criminal
(ps < 0.001). The results were the same for the stranger
(ps < 0.001). A 5 (victim type) × 3 (rating type: familiarity,
aﬀective relatedness, willingness to protect a lone potential
victim in the trolley dilemma) repeated measures ANOVA
was then conducted. The results were generally the same
as those discussed above. However, participants’ ratings of
their willingness to protect the best friend were signiﬁcantly
lower than those of familiarity with and aﬀective proximity
to the person, ps < 0.001. In addition, their deontological
moral judgment ratings concerning the person they disliked
were signiﬁcantly higher than their aﬀective relatedness to the
person (p < 0.001) but not their familiarity with the person
(p= 0.407).
The results showed that participants’ deontological moral
judgments involving a speciﬁc individual did not match their
familiarity with or aﬀective relatedness to the individual. The gap
between participants’ willingness to protect a speciﬁc individual
and familiarity with the individual was calculated by subtracting
the rating score for the latter from that for the former. The
gap between their willingness to protect a speciﬁc individual
and aﬀective relatedness to the individual was computed in
the same manner. The results of the footbridge dilemma are
shown in Figure 5. A 5 (victim type) × 2 (gap type) repeated
measures ANOVA indicated a signiﬁcant interaction eﬀect of
the two factors, F(4,301) = 204.72, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.731. A t
test was conducted for each type of lone potential victim to
compare the two gaps. Participants’ ratings of their willingness
to protect the relative more closely approached the ratings of
their familiarity with the person, t(305) = 2.56, p = 0.011,
d = 0.162. Similar results were obtained for the best friend
[t(305) = 6.85, p < 0.001, d = 0.395] and the person they
disliked [t(304) = −19.87, p < 0.001, d = 1.155]. However,
for the criminal and the stranger, participants’ deontological
moral judgment ratings more closely approached their ratings of
aﬀective relatedness to these individuals [criminal: t(305) = 6.27,
p < 0.001, d = 0.365; stranger: t(305) = 24.37, p < 0.001,
d = 1.397].The results for the trolley dilemma are shown in
Figure 6. All analyses and statistical results were identical to those
of the footbridge dilemma.
FIGURE 5 | Gaps between the extent to which participants are willing
to protect a lone potential victim in the footbridge dilemma and the
extent to which they are familiar with and like the victim in
Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard error.
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FIGURE 6 | Gaps between the extent to which participants are willing
to protect a lone potential victim in the trolley dilemma and the extent
to which they are familiar with and like the victim in Experiment 2. Error
bars represent standard error.
In addition, the gaps betweenmoral judgments and familiarity
or aﬀective relatedness in the footbridge dilemma were compared
to those in the trolley dilemma. When the lone potential victim
was a relative, the gap between the extent to which participants
protected the person and the extent to which they were familiar
with the person in the footbridge dilemma was signiﬁcantly
smaller than that in the trolley dilemma, t(305)= 8.13, p< 0.001,
d = 0.475. The results were the same for the gap between
the extent to which participants protected the relative and
the extent to which they liked the person, t(305) = 8.13,
p < 0.001, d = 0.476. When a best friend was involved, the
gap between participants’ willingness to protect the person and
their familiarity with the person in the footbridge dilemma
was also signiﬁcantly smaller than that in the trolley dilemma,
t(305) = 8.70, p < 0.001, d = 0.506. The same results were
obtained for the gap between deontological moral judgments
involving the best friend and aﬀective relatedness to the person,
t(305) = 8.70, p < 0.001, d = 0.507. When the lone potential
victim was a stranger, the gap between participants’ willingness
to protect the person and their familiarity with the person in
the footbridge dilemma was signiﬁcantly larger than that in the
trolley dilemma, t(305) = 12.83, p < 0.001, d = 0.706. The
results were the same for the gap between deontological moral
judgments involving the stranger and their aﬀective relatedness
to the person, t(305) = 12.83, p< 0.001, d = 0.701. Similarly, the
gap between participants’ willingness to protect a lone potential
victim and their familiarity with the person in the footbridge
dilemma was also signiﬁcantly larger than that in the trolley
dilemma when the person was a disliked person [t(305) = 9.16,
p < 0.001, d = 0.521] or a criminal [t(305) = 7.40, p < 0.001,
d = 0.425]. The same results were obtained for the gap between
participants’ deontological moral judgments involving a lone
potential victim and their aﬀective relatedness to the person when
the person was a disliked person [t(304) = 9.17, p < 0.001,
d= 0.528] or a criminal [t(305)= 7.40, p< 0.001, d= 0.419]. All
the diﬀerences in the gaps between the footbridge and the trolley
dilemma were due to participants’ greater willingness to protect
the lone potential victim in the footbridge dilemma. As previous
studies indicate, the ﬁnding reﬂects the contact principle.
Experiment 2 replicated the result that adults made diﬀerent
moral judgments for individuals with whom they had diﬀerent
relationships. More importantly, Experiment 2 illustrated that
adults’ moral judgments involving speciﬁc individuals did not
match their relationships with the individuals. How much they
consider the good of the lone potential victim does not depend
on how familiar they are with or how aﬀectively they are related
to the person. For relatives and best friends, adults’ moral
judgments were less deontological relative to their relationships
with these individuals. However, their deontological moral
judgments involving people they disliked, criminals and strangers
were far beyond their relationships with these individuals. These
ﬁndings suggest that there may be some latent fairness in
adults’ relationship-based moral judgments. Furthermore, the
extent to which adults made deontological moral judgments
involving relatives, best friends and people they disliked more
closely approximated their familiarity with these people, whereas
their deontological moral judgments involving criminals and
strangers more closely approximated their aﬀective relatedness
to these people. Therefore, cognitive and aﬀective dimensions of
relationships may play diﬀerent roles in adults’ moral judgments
involving diﬀerent individuals. These results were obtained when
the participants made moral judgments toward a variety of lone
potential victims. It is not clear whether the results are similar
when the participants only respond to one type of victim. Thus,
Experiment 3 was carried out with the type of lone potential
victims as the between-subject variable.
EXPERIMENT 3
Experiment 3 aimed to further test the results of Experiments
1 and 2 with the type of lone potential victim as the between-
subject variable. Diﬀerent groups of participants were required
to make moral judgments involving diﬀerent potential victims in
footbridge and trolley dilemmas.
Participants
A total of 628 college students took part in this experiment. The
participants were divided into ﬁve groups. Each group was asked
to decide whether to harm a speciﬁc potential victim to save ﬁve
strangers in footbridge and trolley dilemmas. In each group, half
of the participants ﬁrst responded to the footbridge dilemma.
One hundred twenty-ﬁve participants responded to the stranger
dilemmas: 60 males and 65 females. Their ages ranged from 17.15
to 26.33 years (M = 19.76, SD = 1.72). One hundred twenty
participants made moral judgments in the relative dilemmas:
59 males and 61 females. Their ages ranged from 17.35 to
24.22 years (M = 19.68, SD = 1.29). One hundred eighteen
participants made decisions in the best friend dilemmas: 54males
and 64 females. Their ages ranged from 17.55 to 26.09 years
(M = 19.72, SD = 1.40). In the disliked person dilemmas, there
were 136 participants. Half of themwere males. Their ages ranged
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from 17.26 to 26.02 years (M = 20.01, SD = 1.51). In the
criminal dilemmas, there were 129 participants: 67 males and
62 were females. Their ages ranged from 17.07 to 24.77 years
(M = 20.03, SD = 1.71). There were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in ages between the ﬁve groups, F(4,623) = 1.46, p = 0.231,
η2 = 0.009. The experiment was approved by the Research
Ethics Board of Department of Psychology of Capital Normal
University. Informed written consent was obtained from all of
the participants.
Materials and Procedure
Moral Judgments
The materials and procedure were similar to those of Experiment
2. One diﬀerence was that each group of participants only
responded to moral dilemmas involving a speciﬁc potential
victim. Take the relative footbridge dilemma for example.
The footbridge dilemma (Hauser et al., 2007, p. 18)
You are on a footbridge over the train tracks. You know trains
and can see that the one approaching the bridge is out of
control. On the track under the bridge there are ﬁve people;
the banks are so steep that they will not be able to get oﬀ the
track in time. You know that the only way to stop an out-of-
control train is to drop a very heavyweight into its path. But the
only available, suﬃciently heavy weight is a large man wearing
a backpack, also watching the train from the footbridge. And
this man is your relative. You can shove your relative with the
backpack onto the track in the path of the train, killing him; or
you can refrain from doing this, letting the ﬁve die.
Participants were then asked test questions “What should you
do? Shove your relative or not shove him? Please choose from 1
(very much should not do it) to 6 (very much should do it).”
The trolley dilemma (Hauser et al., 2007)
In the trolley dilemma, participants could throw a switch to
turn the train onto another track, but the action would cause the
death of a relative. They were then asked similar test questions.
Rating of Relationships
Each group of participants was asked to rate their familiarity with
and aﬀective relatedness to the speciﬁc potential victim on the
same six-point scales used in Experiment 2.
Results and Discussion
Moral Judgments Involving Lone Potential Victims
with Different Relationships with the Participants
Each group’s percentage of participants choosing to harm the
lone potential victim is shown in Figure 7. Each percentage
was compared to the chance level with binomial tests. In the
footbridge dilemma, the percentage of participants who decided
to harm the lone potential victim was signiﬁcantly lower than
the chance level in the relative group (p < 0.001), best friend
group (p< 0.001), disliked person group (p= 0.001) and stranger
group (p < 0.001). For the criminal group, the percentage was
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the chance level, p = 0.597. In
the trolley dilemma, the percentage of participants deciding to
harm the lone potential victim was also signiﬁcantly lower than
FIGURE 7 | Percentages of participants who decided to harm a lone
potential victim to save five strangers from death in each group in
Experiment 3.
the chance level in the relative group and best friend group,
ps < 0.001. There were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the
percentage and the chance level in the stranger group, p= 0.283.
The percentage of participants who were willing to sacriﬁce a
disliked person or a criminal was signiﬁcantly higher than chance
level, ps < 0.001. The results were generally similar to those
obtained in Experiments 1 and 2 except that more participants
chose to sacriﬁce the disliked person in the trolley dilemma.
Each group’s rating of their willingness to harm a lone
potential victim to save ﬁve strangers is shown in Figure 8.
An ANOVA was conducted to explore the group diﬀerences
in the footbridge dilemma. The eﬀect of group was signiﬁcant,
F(4,623) = 10.13, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.061. Post hoc Bonferroni
FIGURE 8 | Participants’ rating of their willingness to harm a lone
potential victim to save five strangers from death in each group in
Experiment 3. Error bars represent standard error.
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tests showed that the rating scores of the relative group were
signiﬁcantly lower than those of the disliked person (p = 0.001),
criminal (p< 0.001) and stranger groups (p = 0.002) but not the
best friend group (p= 1.000). The rating scores of the best friend
group were also signiﬁcantly lower than those of the disliked
person (p = 0.028), criminal (p < 0.001) and stranger groups
(p= 0.047). There were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in rating scores
between the disliked, criminal and stranger group, ps = 1.000.
The results were similar to those obtained for the trolley dilemma.
Overall, adults made diﬀerent moral judgments toward close
individuals and those they were not close to.
The Consistency between Moral Judgments Involving
a Lone Potential Victim and Relationships with the
Victim
Participants’ willingness to harm a lone potential victim was
reverse-scored. The resultant scores represented the extent to
which adults were willing to protect the lone potential victim,
i.e., deontological moral judgments. The extent to which each
group of participants is familiar with, likes and protects a lone
potential victim in the footbridge and the trolley dilemma is
shown in Figure 9. A 5 (group) × 3 (rating type: familiarity,
aﬀective relatedness, willingness to protect the lone potential
victim in the footbridge dilemma) repeated measures ANOVA
was performed. There was a signiﬁcant interaction eﬀect of
the two factors, F(8,1246) = 73.40, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.320.
Simple eﬀect analysis was conducted with separate repeated
measures ANOVA for each group. For the relative group, the
eﬀect of rating type was signiﬁcant, F(2,118) = 4.38, p = 0.015,
η2 = 0.069. Multiple comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment
indicated that participants’ rating scores of their willingness to
protect the relative were marginally signiﬁcantly lower than those
of their familiarity with the relative (p = 0.052) and signiﬁcantly
lower than those of their aﬀective relatedness to the relative
(p = 0.011). For the best friend group, the eﬀect of rating type
approached signiﬁcance, F(2,116) = 3.05, p = 0.051, η2 = 0.050.
Multiple comparisons found that participants’ rating scores of
FIGURE 9 | Extent to which each group of participants are familiar
with, like and protect a lone potential victim in the footbridge and
trolley dilemmas in Experiment 3. Error bars represent standard error.
their willingness to protect the best friend were marginally
signiﬁcantly lower than those of their aﬀective relatedness to
the person (p = 0.057) but not those of their familiarity with
the person (p = 0.181). There was a signiﬁcant eﬀect of rating
type in the disliked person group, F(2,134) = 132.78, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.665. The rating scores of participants’ willingness to
protect the disliked person were both signiﬁcantly higher than
those of their familiarity with (p= 0.004) and aﬀective relatedness
to the person (p < 0.001). The same eﬀect was found for the
criminal group, F(2,127) = 121.87, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.657.
There were signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the rating scores
of their willingness to protect the criminal and those of their
familiarity with the person (p < 0.001) or aﬀective relatedness
to the person (p < 0.001). For the stranger group, the eﬀect of
rating type was also signiﬁcant, F(2,123) = 53.49, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.465. The extent to which participants were willing to
protect a stranger was signiﬁcantly higher than the extent to
which they were familiar with (p < 0.001) and liked the stranger
(p < 0.001). A 5 (group) × 3 (rating type: familiarity, aﬀective
relatedness, willingness to protect the lone potential victim in the
trolley dilemma) repeatedmeasures ANOVAwas performed. The
results were similar to those involving the footbridge dilemma.
Generally, participants’ rating scores of their willingness to
protect the lone potential victim was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
those of their familiarity with and aﬀective relatedness to the
person in each group. However, participants’ rating scores of their
willingness to protect the lone potential victim were comparable
to those of their familiarity with the victim in the disliked
person group, p = 0.719. The same result was obtained for the
comparison of willingness to protect the lone potential victim and
aﬀective relatedness to the victim in the stranger group, p= 0.449.
Overall, these results replicated those of Experiment 2.
The gaps between participants’ willingness to protect a lone
potential victim and their relationships with the victim in
each group were then analyzed. The results of the footbridge
FIGURE 10 | Gaps between the extent to which each group of
participants are willing to protect a lone potential victim in the
footbridge dilemma and the extent to which they are familiar with and
like the victim in Experiment 3. Error bars represent standard error.
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dilemma are shown in Figure 10. A 5 (group) × 2 (gap type)
repeated measures ANOVA was carried out. The interaction
eﬀect was signiﬁcant, F(4,623) = 83.21, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.348.
A t-test was then conducted for each group. The gap between
deontological moral judgments and familiarity with the lone
potential victim was not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the gap
between deontological moral judgments and aﬀective relatedness
to the victim in the relative group [t(119) = 1.51, p = 0.134,
d = 0.142] and the best friend group [t(117) = 1.32, p = 0.190,
d = 0.127]. For the disliked person group, participants’
willingness to protect the lone potential victim more closely
approximated their familiarity with the victim, t(135) = −11.93,
p < 0.001, d = 1.032. The opposite results were found for the
criminal group [t(128) = 2.40, p = 0.018, d = 0.213] and the
stranger group [t(124) = 6.18, p < 0.001, d = 0.547]. These
two groups’ willingness to protect the lone potential victim more
closely approximated their aﬀective relatedness to the victim. The
results of the trolley dilemma are shown in Figure 11. All the
analyses and statistical results were similar to those obtained for
the footbridge dilemma. Taken together, these results generally
replicated those of Experiment 2 except that deontological moral
judgments did not more closely approximate familiarity with the
lone potential victim in extent rating for the relative and best
friend groups.
Experiment 3 generally conﬁrms the results of Experiments
1 and 2 with the victim type as the between-subject variable.
First, the results indicate that adults’ relationship-based moral
judgments are apparently unfair. Adults were more unwilling to
harm a relative or best friend compared to a disliked person, a
criminal or a stranger as indicated by the results of Experiments
1 and 2. The results may reﬂect adults’ diﬀerent treatment
to ingroup and outgroup members. The distinction between
ingroup and outgroup is especially salient in collectivistic cultures
(Triandis, 1993). Meanwhile, adults made similar choices toward
the relative and the best friend, and they also treated the disliked
FIGURE 11 | Gaps between the extent to which each group of
participants are willing to protect a lone potential victim in the trolley
dilemma and the extent to which they are familiar with and like the
victim in Experiment 3. Error bars represent standard error.
person, the criminal and the stranger similarly. These results
appear inconsistent with those of the previous experiments.
Diﬀerent situations induced by speciﬁc experimental designs
may result in diﬀerent responses. In the within-subject design,
participants must make moral judgments toward diﬀerent
potential victims simultaneously. Participants are more likely
to ﬁnely diﬀerentiate between one victim and another. In the
between-subject design, participants only respond to a speciﬁc
potential victim. Without comparison, their moral judgments
involving a speciﬁc individual may be based on those involving
a category of people. Therefore, individuals of the same category
may be treated similarly. Second, the results indicate that latent
fairness exists in adults’ relationship-based moral judgments.
Adults’ moral judgments were less deontological relative to
their close relationships with relatives and best friends, but
more deontological relative to their distant relationships with
disliked people, criminals and strangers. Finally, the results show
that familiarity is more important in adults’ moral judgments
involving familiar individuals, especial disliked people. Aﬀective
relatedness plays a more crucial role in their moral judgments
involving unfamiliar individuals.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Moral judgments are closely associated with moral behavior (Wu
and Liu, 2014). However, moral judgments are not invariable. As
one enters adulthood, one has contact with an increasing number
of people, and one’s moral judgments are inevitably inﬂuenced
by one’s relationships with others. Thus, understanding adults’
relationship-based moral judgments is theoretically important
for explaining moral behavior in adulthood.
The present study demonstrated that adults made diﬀerent
moral judgments for individuals with whom they had diﬀerent
relationships. Speciﬁcally, when the lone potential victim was a
close individual, including a relative and a best friend, adults
opposed utilitarian moral judgments. Moreover, less utilitarian
moral judgments were made for the relative than for the best
friend in Experiments 1 and 2. The results are consistent
with the ﬁndings of previous studies (Bleske-Rechek et al.,
2010; Tassy et al., 2013). However, the present study also
considered adults’ moral judgments involving individuals who
were not close to them, i.e., people they disliked and criminals,
and indicated utilitarian tendencies toward these individuals.
Meanwhile, the results indicated that criminals were subjected to
more utilitarian moral judgments than people adults disliked in
Experiments 1 and 2. Therefore, adults display unfair treatment
of people over the entire hierarchy of relationships. The apparent
unfairness of adults’ moral judgments may be traced to early
moral development. For example, children’s resource-allocation
decisions vary according to the recipients (Moore, 2009). They
treat their friends in the best manner and other people less well.
The trajectories of adolescents’ prosocial behavior toward family
members and friends also diﬀer (Padilla-Walker et al., 2015). In
addition, some studies show that the age of the lone potential
victim inﬂuences adults’ moral judgments (Bleske-Rechek et al.,
2010; Kawai et al., 2014). Adults are more willing to sacriﬁce
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an older person to save more people. It is suggested that
adult’ moral judgments are unfair when confronted with
people of diﬀerent ages. Despite the unfairness, adults’ moral
decisions were relatively conservative in the present study.
Previous studies have shown that Chinese participants are less
inclined to sacriﬁce one person to save more people than
Western participants (Ahleniusa and Tannsjö, 2012; Gold et al.,
2014).
A more prominent and new ﬁnding of the present study
was that adults’ moral judgments involving a speciﬁc individual
did not correspond to their relationship with the individual.
For close individuals, adults’ moral judgments were less
deontological relative to their familiarity with or positive
aﬀect toward these individuals. By contrast, for individuals
they were not close to, adults made deontological choices
to a larger extent relative to their unfamiliarity with or
negative aﬀect toward these individuals. The results thus
provide evidence of latent fairness in adults’ relationship-
based moral judgments. According to Kohlberg’s cognitive-
development theory, there are six developmental stages of
moral judgments (Kohlberg, 1963). One’s moral judgments
develop from obedience to external power, e.g., from punishment
and authority to internal ethical principles. Empirical studies
also indicate that adults’ stage 5 and stage 6 scores are
signiﬁcantly higher than adolescents’ scores (Martin et al., 1977).
Thus, adults have relatively mature moral judgments and are
able to consider abstract principles such as fairness to some
extent. Speciﬁcally, adults may have tried to prevent their
moral judgments from being aﬀected by their relationships
with the lone potential victims in the present study, which
resulted in the inconsistency between their moral judgments
involving a speciﬁc potential victim and their relationships
with the victim. Moreover, certain moral intuitions, including
the foundation of fairness/reciprocity, are believed to have
developed to guide moral judgments (Graham et al., 2009).
The fairness intuition may motivate adults to adjust their
moral judgments involving speciﬁc individuals. From the
perspective of culture, unlike European American culture’s
emphasis on individuality, Chinese culture underlines the
harmony and interrelatedness of all individuals (Doan and
Wang, 2010). The cultural characteristics may facilitate adults’
consideration of fairness in their moral decisions, especially
when considering individuals with whom they have negative
relationships. Consistent with this argument, both Experiments
2 and 3 demonstrated that the extent to which adults were willing
to protect a disliked person or a criminal was substantially higher
than the extent to which they were familiar with or liked the
person.
Furthermore, the present study demonstrated that for familiar
individuals, especially the disliked person, the extent to which
adults made deontological moral judgments approximated the
extent to which they were familiar with the individual. However,
their deontological moral judgments involving unfamiliar
individuals approximated their aﬀective relatedness to the
individuals. The results suggest that adults’ moral judgments
involving familiar people depend more on their cognition
about these people, whereas those involving unfamiliar people
are more strongly inﬂuenced by their aﬀect toward these
people. Researchers also propose that certain moral judgments
are guided by emotional processes, whereas others largely
engage one’s cognitive processes (Greene et al., 2001, 2004).
Based on Greene et al. (2001, 2004) perspectives, emotional
responses are aroused at once in moral situations, but
cognitive control may guide moral judgments when there
is suﬃcient time or motivation (Conway and Gawronski,
2013). Cognitive and aﬀective processes were elicited by
speciﬁc situations in the studies by Greene et al. (2001,
2004) whereas they were driven by speciﬁc individuals in
the present study. However, the results of the present study
can also be explained by the perspectives discussed above.
When facing moral dilemmas involving a speciﬁc individual,
adults’ aﬀect toward the individual may play an initial role
in their moral judgments. However, with the motivation of
latent fairness, adults may attempt to avoid being inﬂuenced
by their aﬀective relatedness to familiar individuals and,
thus, rely more on their cognitive information when making
moral judgments. Adults’ aﬀective relatedness to unfamiliar
individuals is the only available information for their moral
judgments. Therefore, moral judgments involving unfamiliar
individuals depend more on adults’ aﬀective relatedness to
these individuals. The varying importance of cognition and
aﬀect in moral judgments involving diﬀerent individuals can be
considered further evidence of latent fairness in adults’ moral
judgments.
In sum, the present study reveals two sides of adults’
relationship-based moral judgments. Apparent unfairness exists
in their relationship-based moral judgments. Nevertheless, when
adults’ relationships with speciﬁc individuals are measured and
taken into account, there is latent fairness in adults’ moral
judgments. Moreover, moral judgments involving individuals
with whom adults have diﬀerent relationships have diﬀerent
cognitive and aﬀective bases.
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